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Abstract
A country’s political and economic institutions are critical for economic pros-
perity. The literature abounds with institutional measures, precisely because
institutions are multidimensional. We use panel unit root and cointegration
tests to examine the time-series properties of several institutional measures to
answer two questions. First, do institutional changes tend to be permanent?
Second, which subsets of institutions tend to converge or move together? These
answers have important implications for whether permanent institutional re-
form is possible and whether reforms can be undertaken one institutional area
at a time or instead must simultaneously encompass multiple institutional areas.
1. Introduction
What explains why some countries grow prosperous while others do not? This
question has been at the heart of economic inquiry since the publication of
Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
He concluded, “Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of
opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable ad-
ministration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of
things” (Smith [1776] 1904, p. I.56).1 Smith was highlighting the importance of
rules, or institutions, for economic outcomes. The importance of institutions
for economic performance received renewed focus with the rise of the new
institutional economics in the 1960s. During this period, the pioneering work
of such scholars as Ronald Coase, Harold Demsetz, and Douglass North led to
a resurgence in the idea that a country’s institutions are primarily responsible
The authors thank Arabinda Basistha, an anonymous referee, and the editors for helpful comments,
discussion, and suggestions. Dashle Kelley provided valuable research assistance. We gratefully ac-
knowledge the financial support of the Kendrick Fund.
1 This quote is originally attributed to Smith in 1755 by Stewart (1793).
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for economic prosperity. In this literature, institutions are broadly defined as
the formal and informal rules of the game governing interactions among in-
dividuals (North 1990, 1991).
According to Matthews (1986, p. 903), the emergence of new institutional
economics led to a twofold realization: “institutions do matter, [and] the de-
terminants of institutions are susceptible to analysis by the tools of economic
theory.” Indeed, a large empirical literature clearly demonstrates the link between
prosperity and institutions, using a variety of measures (see, for example, Barro
1996; Aron 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002; Glaeser et al.
2004; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005;
Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe 1999; Ovaska and Sobel 2005; Sobel, Clark,
and Lee 2007). Although we know that institutions matter for economic out-
comes, an important area of inquiry that remains underexplored is the inter-
relationships among the many different political and economic institutions. No-
table scholars, such as F. A. Hayek (1944) and Milton Friedman (1962), have
postulated that a country’s political and economic institutions tend to be in-
terrelated. More specifically, they argue that sustainable political freedoms require
economic freedoms. Understanding the interrelationship between economic and
political institutions was also a central issue in transition economies where policy
makers attempted to reform both institutional areas simultaneously after the
collapse of communism (Kornai 1992, 1998). The varying economic and political
performance of transition countries indicates that we lack a firm understanding
of the complex interplay between institutional areas.
Critical to understanding the relationship between political and economic
institutions is the important distinction between formal and informal institu-
tions. Examples of formal rules include codified legal and political structures
and written rules such as constitutions. Informal rules include culture, norms,
conventions, and mores not backed by formal law but rather by social custom.
Institutions provide the general rules of the game that facilitate economic, social,
and political interactions. In providing the rules of the game, institutions establish
or alter incentives by influencing the costs and benefits associated with certain
types of activities.
An existing literature argues that in order for formal institutions to stick, they
must be grounded in informal institutions (de Soto 1989; Boettke, Coyne, and
Leeson 2008; Williamson 2009). This indicates that informal institutions underlie
certain types of formal institutional arrangements. Although formal institutions
can be changed statutorily, constitutionally, or through other democratic (or
nondemocratic) methods, informal institutions tend to change slowly because
they are embedded in culture, norms, and traditions (Williamson 2000; North
2005). Informal institutions are also important in facilitating interaction where
formal institutions are absent or dysfunctional (Anderson and Hill 2004; Dixit
2004; Leeson 2007, 2008, 2009). In its entirety, this body of research implies that
informal institutions may be more permanent and, also, that because formal
institutions evolve within the context of a given set of existing informal insti-
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tutions, a country’s many formal political and economic institutions are likely
to be interrelated as a result of their common foundation.
The question we set out to address in this paper is whether a country’s many
political and economic institutions are interrelated. Along the way, we also ask
other questions, including whether institutional changes tend to be permanent
or whether institutional reforms tend to erode through time until a country is
back where it started. We consider several well-known measures of political and
economic institutions and use modern time-series techniques that allow the use
of panel data to test for stationarity and cointegration. The use of panel time-
series techniques, as compared to cross-sectional analysis, allows for analysis of
related variables even though they might be shocked out of their long-term
relationships in the short run.
Whether a particular institutional measure is stationary determines whether
or not changes in that institutional structure are permanent. Whether a pair of
institutions are cointegrated determines whether they tend to move together
(that is, whether they remain convergent), in that changes in one will stick
permanently only if the other institution is reformed as well. We use the hierarchy
of social analysis of Williamson (2000) to interpret our results. This hierarchy
provides an analytical framework for understanding the relationship between
different institutions.
Our analysis provides evidence that formal political and economic institutions
are nonstationary, implying that institutional reforms are indeed permanent. We
also find that the two measures of rights-based institutions—civil liberties and
political rights—are stationary, or mean reverting. This is likely because these
measures capture elements of informal institutions that are more permanent and
embedded in a society’s culture. In addition, we find strong evidence that most
measures of a country’s institutions are cointegrated, implying that institutional
reforms will work only if they simultaneously encompass a broad range of dif-
ferent institutions. This has important implications for our understanding of
how institutions relate because although we know that institutions matter, they
cannot be considered in isolation. Political and economic institutions tend to
move together, and reforms in one without simultaneous reforms in related
institutions will fail to be sustaining over time. Focus must be placed on un-
derstanding how and if reforms across multiple institutions can be effectively
undertaken at the same time.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous and related literature
on institutions. Section 3 outlines the time-series tests that we conduct and
discusses how they relate to interesting questions about a country’s institutions
(and changes in them through time). Section 4 introduces several well-known
empirical measures of a country’s institutions. Section 5 tests for stationarity in
each measure, and Section 6 tests for cointegration across the measures. Section
7 concludes.
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2. Literature Review
The importance of institutions for economic outcomes received renewed focus
with the emergence of the new institutional economics in the 1960s. Several
important works provided the foundations of this literature. Coase’s seminal
paper (1960) shifted the discussion of externalities from standard welfare eco-
nomics to a consideration of comparative institutional arrangements. Demsetz
(1967) studied the emergence and evolution of institutional arrangements and
concluded that institutions would emerge where there was a net benefit to their
existence and where transaction costs were not prohibitively high. North and
Thomas (1973) explored the connection between changes in institutions and
such variables as population growth and political rents. Williamson’s (1975)
work on the economics of the firm also brought increasing attention to the
importance of institutions and organizations.
Williamson’s (2000, pp. 596–600) hierarchy of levels of social analysis provides
insight into the role of institutions in economic analysis. This hierarchy is il-
lustrated in Table 1. The higher the level of social analysis, the more permanent
are the associated characteristics and, hence, the slower the rate of change.
Further, each level imposes constraints on the levels below it. For example, a
society’s embedded informal institutions (level 1), which can take from 100 to
1,000 years to change, will constrain the nature of the formal rules of the game
(level 2). The formal rules in turn constrain the interactions that take place
within those institutions (level 3), which ultimately affect the allocation of re-
sources (level 4). Williamson’s hierarchy provides insight into the various levels
of social analysis and how institutions relate to one another. As we discuss in
subsequent sections, we use a variety of institutional measures that can be
mapped to the various levels in Williamson’s hierarchy.
Numerous quantitative studies explore the role of formal institutions in eco-
nomic performance (Aron 2000). Barro (1996) analyzes the relationship between
democracy and economic growth and finds a nonlinear relationship: democracy
enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but hurts growth once some
moderate level of political freedom exists. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001, 2002) consider the role of institutions in economic performance and find
that private-property institutions are the main determinant of economic per-
formance. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) empirically analyze the effect
of institutions, geography, and trade on income and find that institutions trump
geography and trade in explaining differences in income across countries.2 Acem-
oglu and Johnson (2005) unbundle property institutions. They differentiate be-
tween contracting institutions (for example, courts), which enforce agreements
between private citizens, and property rights institutions, which protect citizens
from government expropriation. They find that property rights institutions are
more important than contracting institutions for economic performance. Easterly
2 There is an ongoing debate regarding the primacy of institutions over geography for explaining
economic development (Sachs and Warner 2001; Sachs 2003; Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999).
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Table 1
Williamson’s Hierarchy of Social Analysis
Level Description Time to Change
1 Embeddedness: informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, and
religion
100–1,000 years
2 Institutional environment: formal rules of the game, especially property
(polity, judiciary, and bureaucracy)
10–100 years
3 Governance: play of the game, especially contract (aligning governance
structure with transactions)
1–10 years
4 Resource allocation and employment (prices and quantities, incentive
alignment)
Continuous
(2001) finds that high-quality institutions can overcome ethnic tensions and
conflict. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) find that the quality of institutions
is the driving factor behind whether an abundance of natural resources con-
tributes to economic growth or stagnation.
More recently, increasing focus has been placed on how informal institutions
influence the process of economic change and the resulting economic outcomes.
De Soto (1989) analyzes the clash between formal and informal institutions in
Peru and concludes that although informal institutions facilitate cooperation in
the underground economy, development is limited because of constraints created
by formal institutions. To better understand informal institutions, North (2005)
incorporates belief systems and cognitive elements in his analysis of institutional
evolution and change. Knack and Keefer (1997) provide empirical evidence that
social capital, measured through indicators of trust and civic norms, matters for
economic outcomes. Grier (1997) and Barro and McCleary (2003) explore the
connection between religion and economic growth, while Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2006) analyze the impact of culture on economic outcomes. Williamson
(2009) finds that informal institutions constrain formal institutions and therefore
are an important determinant of economic development.
We contribute to this existing literature on the importance of institutions for
economic outcomes by exploring if and how political and economic institutions
are related. In doing so, we also provide insight into which institutional changes
tend to be permanent and which are only temporary. This is important for
understanding if and how institutional areas can be reformed.
3. Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Testing
Consider an individual time-series variable, , that evolves through timeYt
according to the following equation:
Y p a  b # Y   . (1)t t1 1
The variable is said to be stationary if, when shocked, it tends to revert to aYt
prior, time-invariant mean level. This will be true if the coefficient on the lagged
value of b is less than 1. If, instead, b is equal to or greater than 1, the series
This content downloaded from 157.182.147.116 on October 05, 2018 10:18:58 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
116 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
Figure 1. Response of a stationary time series to a one-time shock
is nonstationary, which means that it has a unit root. A nonstationary series
does not have a permanent mean level; rather, any changes are permanently
incorporated into the level of the series. Even readers who are unfamiliar with
the time-series literature will likely know one example of a nonstationary process:
the random walk.3 This is the case when, in equation (1), and ,a p 0 b p 1
producing
Y p Y   . (2)t t1 t
With the dynamics produced by equation (2), all changes are permanent, and
the level of the variable will tend to remain at its level from the previous period,
permanently incorporating any changes introduced through shocks, . This dif-t
ference can be seen in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows an example of how a stationary time series responds to a one-
time change. Here, a change eventually decays, and the series returns to its prior
level. Figure 2 shows how a nonstationary time series responds to a one-time
change. This time, the change is permanently incorporated into the level of the
series.
Applying this concept to international measures of institutions allows us to
estimate whether, for each measure, changes to the series remain permanent.
For example, the United States has recently devoted substantial resources to
intervention in Iraq that is meant to permanently reform the country’s political
3 For a good overview of basic time-series properties, including stationarity and cointegration, see
Greene (2008).
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Figure 2. Response of a nonstationary time series to a one-time shock
institutions. If successful, the important question remains whether, after the
occupation ends, Iraq’s new institutions will persist or will decay to their original
level.
Testing for stationarity can be done using several different tests that use slightly
different methods. We perform the entire battery of tests with our data to see
which institutional measures exhibit stationarity and which do not.
Although stationarity is a property of an individual time series, cointegration
refers to a relationship among two or more different nonstationary time series.
In a broad sense, if two series are cointegrated, they tend to move back together
after being shocked apart. More technically, if and denote two nonstationaryX Yt t
time-series variables, define a new variable, , that is the following linear com-Zt
bination of and :X Yt t
Z p a  b # Y  b # X   . (3)t 1 t 2 t t
The new series, , essentially represents the difference between the series. If theZt
two are cointegrated and tend to be convergent through time, then the variable
will be stationary. If the two tend to drift apart or are not convergent, thenZt
will be nonstationary.Zt
Applying this concept to international measures of institutions allows us to
estimate whether it is possible to reform specific individual institutions without
the necessity of reforming others. If two institutions are cointegrated, a change
in one will be permanent only if both change. In other words, a reform to only
one will be meaningless in the long run because it will be pulled back to the
long-term path determined by the other institution(s).
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If they are not cointegrated, each can be individually changed independent
of changes to the other. This would imply that reforms can be made to institutions
successfully even if only one institution is altered. Just as with stationarity, we
present several different tests of cointegration, using slightly different method-
ologies, for our variables measuring institutions.
Until recently, such estimation would not have been possible. Traditionally,
these tests are conducted on data spanning a long period, using, for example,
two series for the same country. Unfortunately, most indices of institutional
quality are fairly recent, and many span only a limited historical period, some-
times in 5-year intervals. Because of this lack of length in the data, these time-
series tests would be impossible to perform for a given country. Recently, how-
ever, methods have been developed that allow the use of combined cross-section
and time-series data that allow this type of testing to be conducted for panel
data. In essence, panel unit root and cointegration testing exploits both the cross-
sectional and time-series components of the data to allow enough observations
on which to conduct testing.
The benefit of using panel time-series techniques over simple cross-sectional
analysis is that they allow for variables to be related over long time horizons,
even though they may be shocked out of this long-term relationship for short-
term periods. These short-term distortions are problematic for cross-sectional
analyses, particularly those performed on the first difference or change in the
variables. For example, if and are cointegrated but get shocked apart, whenX Yt t
they are coming back together we would witness , say, falling while isX Yt t
simultaneously rising as the two attempt to get back to their long-term cointe-
grating path. Therefore, it is possible to pick up negative correlations in cross-
sectional analysis of and when the relationship between the two variablesDY DXt t
is, instead, a true positive relationship over a long time horizon.
In addition, because there will be wide variation across countries in the degree
to which and are shocked apart in a given year, a single cross section willX Yt t
see a more widely disbursed cloud of data, increasing the standard errors of the
regression and potentially creating bias as the regression line tries to fit outlier
observations. For example, if democracy and capitalism are cointegrated, then
they will stay together in the long run, but it will still be possible to witness
many observations that may be contrary to this (that is, way off the true re-
gression line) in any one period in a cross section of countries. Therefore, it
may look as if there are many counterexamples to the pairing of democracy and
capitalism in any given year, despite the presence of a long-term positive as-
sociation between the two. Panel time-series techniques properly account for
these dynamics and are therefore a better way to test for true relationships among
a country’s institutions.
4. Institutional Measures
Our analysis relies on seven well-known measures of political and economic
institutions, summarized in Table 2. All indices are collected at 5-year intervals
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(1970–2005) whenever they are present. We made an attempt to include as many
popular institutional measures as possible, but we were able to use only those
with sufficient observations in both the time and cross-sectional dimensions
(generally at least three comparable 5-year dates, depending on the nature of
the cross sections within each year). We did collect, but were unable to perform
analysis for, several other popular measures of institutions, such as central bank
independence, government effectiveness, risk of expropriation, and judicial in-
dependence. Across all measures, 215 countries are represented over a 35-year
window. The institutional measures capture different aspects of economic and
political institutions, summarized as follows:4
Economic Freedom of the World. Economic freedom of the world (EFW) is
a measure of a country’s economic freedom. Each EFW score is calculated using
42 different measures to create an index ranking countries around the world.
Economic freedom is measured in five different areas: (1) size of government,
(2) legal structure and security of property rights, (3) access to sound money,
(4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and
business.
Political Rights. Political rights (PR) is a measure of the political rights held
by citizens. The calculation of this variable is based on 10 political questions
grouped into three subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and par-
ticipation, and functioning of government.
Civil Liberties. Civil liberties (CL) is a measure of the civil liberties held by
citizens. The calculation of this variable is based on 15 political questions grouped
into four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and or-
ganizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.
Constraints on the Executive. Constraints on the executive (EXEC) is a mea-
sure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers
of chief executives, whether individuals or collectives. Accountability may be
executed by a variety of groups, including legislatures, an independent judiciary,
ruling parties, councils of nobles or advisors, or the military. The main focus
of this measure is the various checks and balances on the executive decision-
making process.
Democracy. Democracy (DEM) is a measure of the degree of democracy in
a given country based on the competitiveness of political participation, the open-
ness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the constraints on the
chief executive.
Autocracy. Autocracy (AUT) is a measure of the degree of autocracy in a
given country based on the competitiveness of political participation, the reg-
ulation of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive
recruitment, and the constraints on the chief executive.
4 The different scales for these variables (even that “better” in some is a higher number but a
lower number in others) are not problematic for our analysis because the cointegration analysis
includes both the potential for a constant difference between the variables and either the positive
or negative relationships.
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Economic freedom of the world Gwartney and Lawson (2008) 130
Political rights Freedom House (2008) 191
Civil liberties Freedom House (2008) 191
Constraints on the executive Jaggers and Marshall (2000) 128
Democracy Jaggers and Marshall (2000) 128
Autocracy Jaggers and Marshall (2000) 128
Autocracy2 Alvarez et al. (2000) 134
Autocracy2. Autocracy2 (AUT2) is a measure classifying regimes on the basis
of their degree of autocracy. Countries are assigned to one of three categories:
democracies, bureaucracies (dictatorships with a legislature), and autocracies
(dictatorship without a legislature).
Consideration of these measures in the context of Williamson’s hierarchy of
social analysis, discussed in Section 2, provides insight regarding expected changes
in institutions. Most of our measures of institutions map mainly to level 2,
although some capture aspects of levels 1 and 3. The terms EXEC, DEM, AUT,
and AUT2 clearly deal with the formal rules of political institutions and hence
map neatly to level 2 of Williamson’s hierarchy of social analysis. Some elements
of EFW map to level 2 (for example, legal structure and security of property
rights), while others map to level 3 (for example, size of government, soundness
of money, and regulation). The former capture formal rules, including the struc-
ture of the legal system, while the latter consist of policies adopted in a given
set of formal institutions.
The terms PR and CL differ from the other measures and therefore deserve
additional explanation. They are not intended to be direct measures of govern-
ment performance or formal political institutions. According to Freedom House,
“The survey does not rate governments or government performance per se, but
rather the real-world rights and social freedoms enjoyed by individuals. Freedoms
can be affected by state actions, as well as by nonstate actors, including insurgents
and other armed groups. Thus, the survey ratings generally reflect the interplay
of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental” (Freedom House
2008). Although not serving as direct measures of democratic and government
institutions, these measures capture important inputs of these institutions. Land-
man (2005, p. 48) notes “that Freedom House [the PR and CL indices] includes
a wide range of institutional and rights concepts in its checklists, which are
reflected in its overall scores.” Because the PR and CL measures take a broader
view of freedoms, they have elements that map to levels 1 and 2 of Williamson’s
hierarchy and therefore tend to be less likely to change.
For example, the PR measure includes suffrage and minority access and par-
ticipation in the political process. Although these elements are clearly influenced
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by formal political rules, they are also largely affected by embedded institutions
in terms of the rights that people possess. As history indicates, changes in suffrage
or the rights of minorities can take significant time because they require broader
society-wide changes in embedded perceptions and norms. Similarly, the PR
measure includes perceptions of government corruption. Although government
corruption is somewhat a matter of formal institutions—for example, institu-
tional design and checks and balances—it is also a function of existing norms
within the culture. Norms of intolerance toward corruption, including a will-
ingness to punish corrupt behaviors, must exist among citizens. This means that
although formal institutions are important, the ultimate outcome for corruption
is largely a function of informal institutions in the form of culture, norms, and
perceptions. The implication is that the questions associated with the PR mea-
sures capture elements of informal institutions located in level 1 of Williamson’s
hierarchy.
Likewise, the CL measure captures elements of cultural expression, private
association, and religious and academic expression. Aron (2000, p. 109) notes
that CL is a measure of social capital, a notion that includes trust, norms of
reciprocity, and other embedded elements of social relations. These measures go
beyond constraints on government and also focus on individuals outside the
public arena. As such, they capture many elements of embedded informal in-
stitutions, including traditions, religion, and customs, and we would expect
changes in these institutional measures to be slower or less likely to occur.
The implication of Williamson’s hierarchy of social analysis for our empirical
analysis is as follows: because institutions near the top of his hierarchy are slower
to change and thus are more permanent, we are most likely to see evidence of
stationarity (mean reversion) in the upper-level institutional measures. As we
move down Williamson’s hierarchy, it becomes increasingly likely to find evi-
dence of nonstationarity (permanent changes).
5. Testing for Stationarity in Institutional Measures
Here we present the results of our statistical testing for whether these insti-
tutional measures are stationary (mean reverting) or nonstationary (unit root)
processes. We conduct three panel unit root tests on each series: the Im, Pesaran,
and Shin (2003) W-statistic, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, and the Mad-2x
dala and Wu (1999) Phillips-Perron test. A significant test statistic rejects the2x
null hypothesis that the series has a unit root; thus, significant values indicate
that the series is stationary. For institutional changes to be permanent, the series
should be nonstationary or have an insignificant test statistic. Our results are
presented in Table 3.
For four of the institutional measures, all three tests confirm nonstationarity:
EXEC, DEM, AUT, and AUT2. The EFW index is nonstationary in two of the
three tests, although the one and only significant result is significant only at the
10 percent level. Therefore, it is likely that EFW is also nonstationary. Changes
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Table 3
Panel Unit Root Tests for Institutional Measures
Measure IPS ADF MW/PP Stationarity
EFW 1.59 212.81 204.26 Nonstationarya
PR 1.70** 325.90** 301.43** Stationary
CL 3.80** 317.03** 322.50** Stationary
EXEC .06 123.56 114.95 Nonstationary
DEM 1.96 75.65 83.19 Nonstationary
AUT 7.40 95.84 93.08 Nonstationary
AUT2 .03 46.77 44.81 Nonstationary
Note. All tests allow for heterogeneous dynamics (individual roots) and lag length selection by
standard industrial classification and employ Newey-West bandwidth selection using the Bartlett
kernel. Results for stationarity are for all tests unless indicated. IPS p Im, Pesaran, and Shan (2003)
W-statistic; ADF p augmented Dickey-Fuller ; MW/PP p Maddala and Wu (1999) Phillips-2x
Perron statistic.2x
a In two of three tests.
 Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
or reforms to any of these institutions are predicted to become permanent. On
the other hand, the results for the Freedom House measures of PR and CL are
significant, which indicates that these series are stationary or mean reverting.
According to our data analysis, changes or reforms to these series tend to die
out, and with the passage of time, these institutions return to some predetermined
mean value.
These results fit with the predictions of Williamson’s hierarchy of social analysis
and the discussion in Section 4. Given that PR and CL capture a variety of
institutional concepts, including some informal embedded (level 1) elements,
they are more likely to be stationary, or mean reverting, than the other insti-
tutional measures used in our analysis. Level 1 institutions take significant time
to permanently change, and shocks to these institutions are likely to be tem-
porary, with a return to the original mean. This is because informal embedded
institutions “display a great deal of inertia—some because they are functional
(such as conventions); others take on a symbolic value. . . . Many are perva-
sively linked with complementary institutions (formal and informal), etc.” (Wil-
liamson 2000, p. 597). We believe that it is the embedded informal institutional
elements captured in the PR and CL measures that underly our finding of mean
reversion, or stationarity.
To provide a specific illustration of our results, consider the institutional
measures for El Salvador. El Salvador is one of the many examples in the data
that appears to show the simultaneous stationarity of PR and CL and nonsta-
tionarity of the other institutional measures (EFW, EXEC, DEM, AUT, and
AUT2). Figures 3 and 4 show El Salvador’s PR and CL indices.
After upward spikes in both of these series in 1980, both reverted to their
original levels. The 2005 ending values for these series are identical to the initial
1975 values, despite both experiencing large shocks in 1980. This mean reversion
illustrates the stationarity of these two measures.
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Figure 3. Stationary institutional measure for El Salvador: political rights
Figure 4. Stationary institutional measure for El Salvador: civil liberties
Figures 5–8 show El Salvador’s other institutional measures, which all un-
derwent changes that remained permanent (that is, the changes do not revert
with time). The upward spike in EFW (Figure 5) in 1995, for example, remained
permanent, as did the upward spikes in EXEC (Figure 6) and DEM (Figure 7)
in 1985 and the downward spikes in AUT and AUT2 (Figure 8) in 1985. For
all four of the institutional measures illustrated, the changes were permanently
incorporated into the series, in contrast with the institutional measures illustrated
in Figures 3 and 4, where the changes were only temporary. These are precisely
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Figure 5. Nonstationary institutional measure for El Salvador: economic freedom of the
world.
Figure 6. Nonstationary institutional measure for El Salvador: constraints on the executive
the patterns for stationary and nonstationary time series given in the hypothetical
examples (illustrated in Figures 1 and 2) previously discussed.
6. Testing for Cointegration across Institutional Measures
In this section, we present our results of the pairwise cointegration tests be-
tween the institutional measures. For two series to be cointegrated requires that
they both be individually nonstationary but that there exist a linear combination
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Figure 7. Nonstationary institutional measure for El Salvador: democracy
Figure 8. Nonstationary institutional measures for El Salvador: autocracy (solid line) and
autocracy 2 (dashed line).
of the two that is stationary.5 Therefore, because PR and CL were found to be
stationary, they are excluded from our cointegration tests.6 Our pairwise panel
5 Table A1 presents the unit root tests performed on the first differenced series, and in all cases
we can reject the presence of a second unit root in these series.
6 Because they were borderline nonstationary, we did perform cointegration tests using PR and
CL and found them to be cointegrated (although generally with lower test statistic values) with all
of the other institutional measures. Thus, within our sample period, the changes among the various
formal institutions are more closely correlated with one another than they are with the changes in
informal institutions. However, the extended long-term paths of a country’s formal and informal
institutions are indeed intertwined over extremely long periods.
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Table 4
Pairwise Panel Cointegration Tests among Institutional Measures
EXEC DEM AUT AUT2
PP-r test:
EFW 5.09 4.97 5.80 3.20




EFW 4.55 7.65 5.82 5.50




EFW 4.23 6.18 4.86 4.99
EXEC 7.79 7.89 6.58
DEM 3.70
AUT 6.08
Note. All tests allow for heterogeneous dynamics (individual roots) and lag length
selection by standard industrial classification and employ Newey-West bandwidth se-
lection using the Bartlett kernel. All values are significant at the 1% level. Although a
test for simultaneous cointegration of all five measures could not be performed, after
dropping the one with the fewest observations (AUT2), the remaining four measures
(AUT, EXEC, DEM, and EFW) are all mutually cointegrated. For the nonparametric
Phillips-Perron r test, PP-r p 4.30 (p p 1%); for the nonparametric Phillips-Perron
test, PP p 5.40 (p p 1%); and for the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, ADF p 3.77
(p p 1%).
cointegration tests for the remaining nonstationary institutional measures are
shown in Table 4.
Three cointegration tests are performed, all according to Pedroni (1999, 2004).
They are the nonparametric Phillips-Perron group r test, the nonparametric
Phillips-Perron group test, and the group augmented Dickey-Fuller test. A sig-
nificant test statistic rejects the null of no cointegration; therefore, significant
values indicate that the two series are cointegrated and that they move together
through time. In each and every pairwise comparison, these institutional mea-
sures show clear evidence of cointegration in all three tests. Therefore, it is
possible to conclude that, indeed, all of these institutional measures are cointe-
grated and thus move together within a country through time. There are long-
term ties among and between all of these economic and political institutions
that cause them to move, over the long run, in unison.
This finding supports both the theoretical and empirical literature regarding
institutions and economic growth. In their analysis of the emergence and sus-
tainability of political and economic systems, North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009)
contend that the two systems help sustain each other. They develop a theory of
double balance in which political and economic institutions each have their own
equilibrium and in which, in addition, the relationship between the two systems
also has its own unique equilibrium. They conclude that this double balance
implies that sustainable change to either system must be accompanied by fun-
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Figure 9. El Salvador’s cointegrated institutions
damental changes in the other system. Rodrik (2007, pp. 35–44) indicates em-
pirically that generating quick growth spurts is often associated with a narrow
set of institutional and policy changes. However, sustainable growth must be
accompanied by extensive institutional reform across economic and political
institutions. For growth to be sustainable, changes that provide an incentive for
productive entrepreneurship and the efficient allocation of resources must be
institutionalized. Absent deeper reform, marginal changes will tend to unravel.
Along these lines, Rodrik (2007, p. 43) concludes that “the key to longer-term
prosperity, once growth is launched, is to develop institutions that maintain
productive dynamism and generate resilience to external shocks.”
Again, to illustrate the specific implications of our findings, we return to the
data for El Salvador. The fact that a country’s EFW, EXEC, DEM, AUT, and
AUT2 measures are cointegrated means that over long periods they tend to move
together. Figure 9 shows several of these measures for El Salvador.7
Clearly, over this 35-year period, all of these measures have moved together,
and clearly there were periods (such as 1985–90) when they were more divergent
from each other and subsequently corrected this differential. The data illustrate
that these institutions move together over the long term within a country, despite
short-term differentials at any given cross-sectional moment.
7 All of El Salvador’s cointegrated institutional measures demonstrate our point. We present just
three measures here to make the figure easier to examine (see Figure 8 for AUT and AUT2).
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Table 5
Pairwise Panel Cointegration Tests among Economic Freedom of the World Areas
Area 2 Area 3 Area 4 Area 5
PP-r test:
Area 1: size of government 8.70 9.10 8.43 9.05
Area 2: property rights 7.14 6.26 6.66
Area 3: money 7.34 8.04
Area 4: international trade 7.20
PP test:
Area 1: size of government 3.41 7.92 5.65 6.03
Area 2: property rights 15.16 14.77 15.79
Area 3: money 9.63 10.17
Area 4: international trade 11.23
ADF test:
Area 1: size of government 2.32 5.68 3.59 4.94
Area 2: property rights 12.39 11.94 12.96
Area 3: money 8.01 8.41
Area 4: international trade 10.50
Note. Test statistics are from Pedroni (1999, 2004). A significant test statistic rejects the null of no coin-
tegration; thus, significant values indicate that the two series are cointegrated. All tests allow for hetero-
geneous dynamics (individual roots) and lag length selection by standard industrial classification and employ
Newey-West bandwidth selection using the Bartlett kernel. All values are significant at the 1% level. Area
5 p regulation of credit, labor, and business.
One somewhat tangential but interesting question is whether the subcom-
ponent areas of the EFW index are cointegrated. The index is composed of five
subareas, including (1) size of government (expenditures, taxes, and enterprises),
(2) legal structure and security of property rights, (3) access to sound money,
(4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and
business. One reason why this question is of interest is that in simple cross-
sectional analysis, depending on the year used, there are counterintuitive negative
cross-sectional correlations that sometimes appear. We first tested each EFW
subarea for stationarity and found that area 2 is stationary, while areas 1, 3, 4,
and 5 are nonstationary. We therefore exclude area 2 from the cointegration
tests. Table 5 presents the results of these three cointegration tests among the
nonstationary subcomponent areas of the EFW index. Note that although area
1 has no column (and area 5 has no row), all possible combinations for these
two areas are shown.
Similar to the results for most of the institutional measures, we again find
that the four subareas of the EFW index are pairwise cointegrated. Therefore,
economic reforms to the size of government, legal structure and property rights,
monetary policy, international trade, and regulation are not independent phe-
nomena. Meaningful reforms to any one of these institutions can happen only
as part of a broader increase in all areas of economic freedom.8
One explanation why so many of a country’s economic and political insti-
8 In addition, we performed a test to determine if the four subareas, jointly, were cointegrated,
and they were.
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tutions are cointegrated is that when changes to institutions become politically
and socially feasible in one area, they also tend to simultaneously become possible
in other areas as well. A shift in the median voter’s preferences or ideology, a
change in the ruling party in power, or the collapse of existing formal institutions
tend to lead to widespread changes across many institutions. It is unlikely that
a country would be in a situation to enact major reforms to one institution
without other similar opportunities being present for other institutions. Evidence
from transition countries indicates a snowball effect whereby even marginal
reforms to one institution can be reinforcing and can result in subsequent reforms
to other institutions (Brezis and Verdier 2003). For example, Fidrmuc (2003)
finds that political liberalization in transition countries reinforces economic
liberalization.
7. Conclusion
Although a large empirical literature has examined measures of countries’
institutions and their links to growth and prosperity (and to each other) using
cross-sectional data, we perform the first serious time-series investigation of these
measures using modern panel unit root and cointegration analysis. This analysis
yields several new and interesting insights into these institutions and their
interrelationships.
First, we find that most of a country’s formal political and economic insti-
tutions are nonstationary, which implies that institutional reforms and changes
can indeed be permanently maintained. The exceptions to this finding are rights-
based measures of a country’s institutions, which contain embedded informal
elements such as norms and traditions. We find these institutions to be stationary
and mean reverting, which means that they are more permanent, and changes
tend to be only temporary, with the series reverting back to its prior level. Thus,
although it may be possible to achieve permanent institutional reform in many
areas, some underlying institutions in countries appear to be predetermined by
long-standing and permanent social and cultural norms. This is consistent with
Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy of levels of social analysis and the time required
for sustainable change at each level.
Second, we find clear evidence that all of a country’s nonstationary institutions
are cointegrated. This suggests that there are long-term ties between formal
political and economic institutions, such as economic freedom, constraints on
the executive, democracy, and autocracy, which implies that they all tend to move
together through time within a country. It also suggests that reforms to one set
of institutions likely will not hold unless other institutions are simultaneously
reformed as well. Had these nonstationary institutions not been cointegrated, it
would have implied that each could be changed permanently, independently of
the other institutions. Thus, this finding of cointegration suggests that institu-
tional reform may be more difficult than it appears because it requires simul-
taneous broader reforms in the entire set of institutions in the country. The
This content downloaded from 157.182.147.116 on October 05, 2018 10:18:58 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
130 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
overall size of a country’s government sector, the degree of regulation or taxation,
the extent of democracy, and political constraints are intertwined and must be
reformed together to result in permanent and meaningful institutional reform.
This has implications for external efforts to encourage specific institutions re-
forms through such mechanisms as conditional foreign aid, state building, and
economic reconstruction.
It has been suggested that a country’s formal political and economic insti-
tutions are outgrowths of underlying informal institutions embodied within
cultural norms. If a common set of informal institutions underlies all of a
country’s formal institutions, there is good reason to believe theoretically that
they all should be cointegrated. This is the underlying logical explanation for
our empirical results.
This also helps to explain Olson’s (1982) finding that large shocks (for example,
wars, revolutions, and economic crises) create opportunities for successful per-
manent institutional change within a country. When these shocks occur, there
is a disruption of the power structure among existing vested interests, and si-
multaneous change across multiple political and economic institutions becomes
feasible. For example, the devastation resulting from World War II led to dramatic
changes in the fundamental structure of a vast array of political and economic
institutions in Japan and Germany. Similar logic can be applied to other crises
as well, including the permanence and institutional breadth of New Deal reforms
and the current widespread institutional responses to the events of September
11, 2001, and the recent financial crisis.
Third, our use of panel time-series techniques is uniquely suited to address
the questions of institutional permanence and interrelation. Simple cross-sec-
tional analysis cannot uncover these long-term facets of the data and suffers
from problems associated with cointegrated variables that are temporarily
shocked out of their long-term relationships. One troubling implication of our
analysis is that because the vast majority of country institutional measures are
nonstationary, they should not be used (in levels) as independent variables in a
regression with other nonstationary variables (such as measures of prosperity).
Such regressions will produce spurious correlations. The reason that this is trou-
bling is that there now is a large literature that uses these measures in precisely
this (incorrect) method. These nonstationary institutional measures can be used
in first-difference form (that is, the change in the series); however, without
incorporating additional terms into the regression to account for the cointe-
grating dynamics (such as an error correction model), they will also suffer from
bias. The failure of the previous empirical institutional literature to properly
account for the time-series properties of these measures calls many of its results
into question.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the fact that all of these institutional
measures are cointegrated suggests that it will be impossible to determine which
of a country’s many institutions is the one responsible for economic prosperity.
As the data for El Salvador show, many of the country’s institutions have changed
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together, and it would be impossible to attribute changes in economic perfor-
mance to a single institution. Many institutions move together through time,
and it is this simultaneous movement that results in changes in economic
performance.
Over the long run, we would not expect to see many cases of mismatches—
a country will generally have all good, all middling, or all weak institutions. In
the long run, countries with good institutions in one area will have them in
others as well. This does not imply that short-term cases of mismatched insti-
tutions cannot or will not exist, nor does it serve as evidence that the two
institutions are not truly related.
The hunt for which institutions (for example, political constraints, autocracy,
democracy, capitalism, and quality of institutions) are the true factors behind
growth will never and can never be solved empirically because of the fact that
they are cointegrated. Any, and all, of the cointegrated institutional measures
will be related to prosperity when examined individually, and in any given cross
section, one set of institutions may appear to be more important than others
simply because of spurious short-term departures from the long-term cointe-
grating paths that these institutions follow.
Appendix
Table A1
Panel Unit Root Tests for the First-Differenced Series of
Institutional Measures: Tests for a Second Unit Root
IPS ADF MW/PP
DEFW 13.03 505.63 687.73
DPR 8.89 453.19 609.06
DCL 7.93 461.40 587.23
DEXEC 3.74 130.88 171.28
DDEM 3.57 127.46 166.70
DAUT 3.46 147.52 191.36
DAUT2 2.15 59.65 68.40
Note. All values are significant at the 1% level. A significant test statistic rejects
the null hypothesis that the first-differenced series has a unit root; thus, sig-
nificant values indicate the absence of a second unit root (in all tests). All tests
allow for heterogeneous dynamics (individual roots) and lag length selection
by standard industrial classification and employ Newey-West bandwidth selec-
tion using the Bartlett kernel. IPS p Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) W-statistic;
ADF p augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic; MW/PP p Maddala and Wu2x
(1999) Phillips-Perron test statistic.2x
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Alvarez, Michael, José A. Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworski. 2000.
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World,
1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anderson, Terry L., and Peter J. Hill. 2004. The Not So Wild, Wild West. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press.
Aron, Janine. 2000. Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence. World Bank
Research Observer 15:99–135.
Barro, Robert J. 1996. Democracy and Growth. Journal of Economic Growth 1:1–27.
Barro, Robert J., and Rachel McCleary. 2003. Religion and Economic Growth across
Countries. American Sociological Review 68:760–81.
Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson. 2008. Institutional Stickiness
and the New Development Economics. American Journal of Economics and Sociology
67:331–58.
Brezis, Elise S., and Thierry Verdier. 2003. Political Institutions and Economic Reforms
in Central and Eastern Europe: A Snowball Effect. Economic Systems 27:289–311.
Coase, R. H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3:1–44.
Demsetz, Harold. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review
57:347–59.
de Soto, Hernando. 1989. The Other Path. New York: Basic Books.
Dixit, Avinash K. 2004. Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Easterly, William. 2001. Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? Economic Development
and Cultural Change 49:687–706.
Fidrmuc, Jan. 2003. Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth during Post-Communist
Transition. European Journal of Political Economy 19:583–604.
Freedom House. 2008. Freedom in the World Index. Washington, D.C.: Freedom House.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?pagep351&ana_pagep341&yearp2008.
Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gallup, John, Jeffrey Sachs, and Andrew Mellinger. 1999. Geography and Economic De-
velopment. International Regional Science Review 22:179–232.
Glaeser, Edward, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004.
Do Institutions Cause Growth? Journal of Economic Growth 9:271–303.
Green, William H. 2008. Econometric Analysis. 6th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson
Prentice Hall.
Grier, Robin. 1997. The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National
Study of Sixty-Three Former Colonies. Kyklos 50:47–62.
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2006. Does Culture Affect Economic
Outcomes? Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(2):23–48.
Gwartney, James D., and Robert A. Lawson. 2008. Economic Freedom of the World. Van-
couver: The Fraiser Institute.
Gwartney, James D., Robert A. Lawson, and Randall G. Holcombe. 1999. Economic
Freedom and the Environment for Economic Growth. Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics 155:1–21.
Hayek, F. A. 1944. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Im, Kyung So., M. Hashem Pesaran, and Yongcheol Shin. 2003. Testing for Unit Roots
in Heterogeneous Panels. Journal of Econometrics 115:53–74.
This content downloaded from 157.182.147.116 on October 05, 2018 10:18:58 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Cointegrating Institutions 133
Jaggers, Keith, and Monty G. Marshall. 2000. Polity IV Project. Center for International
Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, College Park.
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1997. Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff?
A Cross-Country Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:1251–88.
Kornai, Janos. 1992. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. London:
Oxford University Press.
_____. 1998. From Socialism to Capitalism. London: Center for Post-Collectivist Studies.
Landman, Todd. 2005. Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study. Washington D.C.:
Georgetown University Press.
Leeson, Peter T. 2007. Trading with Bandits. Journal of Law and Economics 50:303–21.
_____. 2008. Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange. Journal of Legal Studies 37:
161–81.
_____. 2009. The Laws of Lawlessness. Journal of Legal Studies 38:471–503.
Maddala, G. S., and Shaowen Wu. 1999. A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with
Panel Data and New Simple Test. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61:631–52.
Matthews, R. C. O. 1986. The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth.
Economic Journal 96:903–18.
Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, Ragnar Torvik. 2006. Institutions and the Resource Curse.
Economic Journal 116:1–20.
North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
_____. 1991. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1):97–112.
_____. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
North, Douglass C., and Robert Paul Thomas. 1973. The Rise of the Western World.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social
Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, Conn: Yale University
Press.
Ovaska, Tomi, and Russell S. Sobel. 2005. Entrepreneurship in Post-Socialist Economies.
Journal of Private Enterprise 21:8–28.
Pedroni, Peter. 1999. Critical Values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels
Multiple Regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61:653–70.
_____. 2004. Panel Cointegration: Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties of Pooled
Time Series Tests, with an Application to the PPP Hypothesis. Econometric Theory 20:
597–625.
Rodrik, Dani. 2007. One Economics Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic
Growth. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Institutions Rule: The
Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development.
Journal of Economic Growth 9:131–65.
Sachs, Jeffrey. 2003. Institutions Don’t Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on per Capita
Income. Working Paper No. 9490. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
Mass.
Sachs, Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner. 2001. The Curse of Natural Resources. European
Economic Review 45:827–38.
This content downloaded from 157.182.147.116 on October 05, 2018 10:18:58 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
134 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
Smith, Adam. [1776] 1904. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,
edited by Edwin Cannan. 5th ed. London: Methuen & Co.
Sobel, Russell S., J. R. Clark, and Dwight R. Lee. 2007. Freedom, Barriers to Entry,
Entrepreneurship, and Economic Progress. Review of Austrian Economics 20:221–36.
Stewart, Dugald. 1793. Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, L.L.D. Edinburgh:
Royal Society of Edinburgh.
Williamson, Claudia R. 2009. Informal Institutions Rule: Institutional Arrangements and
Economic Performance. Public Choice 139:371–87.
Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
_____. 2000. The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of
Economic Literature 38:595–613.
This content downloaded from 157.182.147.116 on October 05, 2018 10:18:58 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
